

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

50X1-HUM

COUNTRY Poland

REPORT

SUBJECT Political Attitude and Reliability
of the Polish Armed Forces

DATE DISTR.

6 APR 1959

NO. PAGES

1

REFERENCES

RD

DATE OF
INFO.

50X1-HUM

PLACE &
DATE ACQ.

50X1-HUM

SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

[redacted] a report containing information on the political attitude and reliability of the Polish Armed Forces. Included in the report are lists of (a) high-ranking officers who [redacted] would be likely to oppose Gomulka and advocate a return to a Stalinist policy and (b) high-ranking officers who are considered pro-Western sympathizers.

50X1-HUM

50X1-HUM

50X1-HUM

DATE	#	X	ARMY	#	X	NAVY	#	X	AIR	#	X	FBI		AEC					
------	---	---	------	---	---	------	---	---	-----	---	---	-----	--	-----	--	--	--	--	--

Note: Washington distribution indicated by "X"; Field distribution by "#".

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

50X1-HUM

COUNTRY: Poland

DATE: 19 March 1959

SUBJECT: Political Attitude and Reliability
of the Polish Armed Forces

NO. OF PAGES: 6

DATE OF INFORMATION:

PLACE ACQUIRED:

50X1-HUM

50X1-HUM

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

-2-

Political Attitude and Reliability of the Polish Armed ForcesExistence of an organized anti-Gomulka group within the Polish Armed Forces

1. After the political developments which took place in 1956, some officers felt that the Gomulka's "democratization" program should not be applied to the armed forces. They were afraid, that should this program be put into effect, the officers would lose a certain amount of prestige and authority established during the pre-Gomulka period. Many realized that they might either be transferred to lesser positions or released from the armed forces because of the political affiliation which they had previously professed. It seemed, however, that the majority of the high-ranking officers who remained in the Polish armed forces after 1956 assumed a "sit and wait" attitude.

50X1-HUM

attributed this primarily to the atmosphere of distrust created by the existence of an extensive informer system which operated within the armed forces.

2. following high ranking officers would be likely to oppose Gomulka and advocate a return to a Stalinist policy:

50X1-HUM

- a. Major General WITASZEWSKI (fnu) - Polish Military Attache in Prague, Czechoslovakia.

50X1-HUM

- b. Major General Leszek KRZEMIEN - Polish representative to the United Nations Armistice Commission in Korea.

50X1-HUM

- c. Major General Janusz ZARZYCKI - Chief of the Main Political Administration of the Polish Armed Forces and Vice Minister of Defense.

50X1-HUM

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

[REDACTED]
50X1-HUM

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

-3-

- d. Brigadier General BLUM (fnu) - Chief of the Propaganda Section of the Main Political Administration of the Polish Armed Forces.

[REDACTED]
50X1-HUM

- e. Brigadier General MALKO (fnu) - First Deputy Chief of the Main Political Administration of the Polish Armed Forces.

[REDACTED]
50X1-HUM

- f. Colonel ZAMOYSKI (fnu) - Deputy Chief of the Propaganda Section of the Main Political Administration of the Polish Armed Forces.

[REDACTED]
50X1-HUM

- g. Brigadier or Major General KAMINSKI (fnu) - Deputy Commander of the Main Administration of the Tank and Motorized Forces.

[REDACTED]
50X1-HUM

- h. Brigadier General Josef URBANOWICZ - Deputy Commander for Political Affairs of the Maritime Military District.

[REDACTED]
50X1-HUM

- i. Rear Admiral Zdislaw STUDZINSKI - Commander of the Polish Naval Forces.

[REDACTED]
50X1-HUM

3.
[REDACTED]

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

50X1-HUM

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

-4-

Pro-Western group

4. The majority of officers who were suspected of pro-Western leanings were purged from the armed forces prior to Gomulka's ascension to power. Despite these purges, however, [redacted] up to 50 percent of the officers presently serving in the armed forces sympathized secretly with the West. 50X1-HUM

[redacted] Among the high ranking officers, the following were considered pro-Western sympathizers: 50X1-HUM

- a. Major General KUROIPIESKA (fnu) - Commander of the Warsaw Military District. He was appointed to this post in 1956. 50X1-HUM

- b. Rear Admiral WISNIEWSKI (fnu) - Chief of Staff of the Polish Naval Forces. 50X1-HUM

- c. Major General FREY-BIELECKI (fnu) - Commander of the Polish Air Force. 50X1-HUM

General Morale and Attitude Toward the West

5. [redacted] a majority of the Polish people (up to about 80 percent) would be unwilling to fight on the Soviet side against the United States, Great Britain, or France. The main reason for this was the traditional Polish sympathy for these countries, and the equally traditional animosity toward the Russians, which had existed in Poland for centuries and still remained strong to the present time. The majority of the Polish population was generally aware that the Western nations enjoyed both a higher standard of living and a greater political freedom. As far as the military aspect was concerned, the general opinion prevailed that the Western powers possessed better technical equipment and greater resources to produce the armament necessary to win a nuclear war. World War II caused tremendous destruction and loss of lives in Poland, and this fact would never be forgotten by the Polish people, [redacted] Furthermore, the Polish people were fearful 50X1-HUM

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

50X1-HUM

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

-5-

that Poland would suffer an even greater devastation in the event of a nuclear war. However, a point on which [redacted] the overwhelming majority of Poles were in complete accord was that they would not like to live under another German occupation. The Communists were aware of this popular frame of mind, and were constantly directing their propaganda campaign to intensify this hatred against the Germans. The propaganda line of the Communists continuously stressed that the Western Allies were arming West Germany and reviving "German Militarism," to be eventually directed against Poland, and with the aim of reconquering the western parts of Poland previously held by the Germans. At the same time, the propaganda campaign asserted that the Soviet Union was the only great power which took a definite stand with respect to the present Polish western borders, and guaranteed to defend this stand by force if necessary. [redacted] German participation on the Western side, in any future East-West conflict, would force Poland to wholeheartedly support the Soviet Union, in order not to fall once more under German domination.

50X1-HUM

50X1-HUM

Extent of Satisfaction or Dissatisfaction of the Polish General Staff with the Warsaw Pact

6.

50X1-HUM

[redacted] a majority of the officers realized that the Warsaw Pact was an instrument of Soviet policy designed mainly to protect Soviet interests and to establish a more effective control over the armed forces of other Communist Bloc countries in the event of an East-West conflict.

Respective Degree of Reliability of Polish Air, Ground, and Naval Forces

7.

50X1-HUM

[redacted] it would be impossible to accurately predict the degree of reliability of various branches of the Polish Armed Forces in the event of an East-West conflict. Both the Polish General Staff and the Soviet General Staff were fully aware of Polish sentiments toward the West. Under the Warsaw Pact, by virtue of controlling the "Unified Command," the Soviet Union could resort to several measures calculated to increase the reliability of the Polish armed forces toward the Soviet cause during a future East-West conflict. Some of these measures would be as follows:

- a. Deploy Polish units on the front sectors where they would be opposed by the Germans.
- b. Integrate Polish units with larger Soviet units instead of permitting the Polish units to operate independently.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

50X1-HUM

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

-6-

- c. Deploy units of the Polish Armed Forces on other fronts far from the Polish territorial borders.
- d. Replace officers in command positions with those whom the Soviets consider more reliable.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L